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Abstract 
“Tolerance is a flawed virtue for a flawed society.” Schuyt, 2001 
Tolerance entails acceptance of  the very things one disagrees with, disapproves of or dislikes. Tolerance can be 
seen as ‘a flawed virtue’ (Schuyt, 2001), because it concerns acceptance of the differences between others and 
ourselves we would rather fight, ignore or overcome. Although tolerance carries with it this negative connotation 
of conditionality, as imperfect as it may be it does provide a ‘recipe’ for dealing with sometimes irreconcilable 
differences between (groups of) people in society. In this paper an examination of the paradoxical nature of 
tolerance (part I), is followed by a review of academic literature and empirical findings on tolerance and its 
determinants (part II). To conclude, future challenges for tolerance research are outlined (part III). 
Keywords: tolerance, intolerance, toleration, prejudice, intergroup relations 
 
Introduction 
Tolerance is “putting up with something you do not like” (Vogt, 1997: 1). Tolerance is not a 
‘self-evident’ phenomenon: it is often fought for, and reached only after controversy, conflict or 
even war. Tolerance contains an internal paradox of accepting the things one rejects or objects 
to. To overcome or avoid conflict, one needs to tolerate the very things one abhors, disagrees 
with, disapproves of or dislikes (Vogt, 1997; Sullivan et al., 1982; Sullivan and Transue, 1999; 
Gibson, 2006). In other words: “compromise entails tolerance” (Vogt, 1997: 2). Although not 
self-evident, tolerance is not uncommon: all over the world people have proved to be willing 
and able to tolerate and accept the seemingly irreconcilable differences between their own 
values, life-styles, religious beliefs, political views, personal preferences, and those of others. 
For centuries philosophers and researchers alike have been intrigued by the question why 
people tolerate one another, and when and why they do not tolerate others. The urgency and 
relevance of this issue is only too obvious: without tolerance, communities that value diversity, 
equality and peace could not persist (Vogt, 1997). 
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This paper discusses the nature, antecedents and dynamics of tolerance. It consists of three 
parts. Part I deals with the question what tolerance exactly is; historical, philosophical and 
scientific understandings of tolerance will be summarized; and the conceptualization of 
(in)tolerance as a societal and a social characteristic will be outlined. Part II discusses the 
central dilemma’s in tolerance research. It contains a review of empirical literature on 
(in)tolerance and its predictors. In part III, future challenges for tolerance research are 
discussed.  
PART I. THE NATURE OF TOLERANCE  
Tolerance: a European invention  
In Europe the word tolerance appeared as early as in the 2nd century, in The Meditations by 
Marcus Aurelius, who expressed the idea of tolerance as followed: “All men are made one for 
another, either then teach them better, or bear with them.” (in the translation of Casaubon, 
1692: 169). The idea of tolerance has been put forward by philosophers time and again, but 
tolerance has always remained a contested concept. Its practice and limitations have been 
subject to societal debate from the time of Aurelius until to date.  
“Long before the word tolerance gained currency in scientific terminology, it found its root in 
actual resistance against tyranny and repression” (Goudsblom, 2007: 44). In the sixteenth 
century authors - often anonymous, afraid of repercussions - started to use the word tolerance  
in their pamphlets to protest against inquisition and persecution of heretics (Goudsblom, 2007). 
During the middle ages, persecution of heretics by Catholics ended in the Reformation. 
Reformation in early modernity (c. 1500-1800) led to religious wars and insurgencies all over 
Western Europe. Inquisition, or ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as opposed to accusational 
jurisdiction (in which the defendant had more opportunities to actually defend himself) was 
deployed by those in power to enforce religious ‘unity’. There was no division between religious 
and political power in the protestant theocracies in Europe at the time (such as the regime of 
Calvin in Geneva), giving way to forceful repression of non-protestants. 
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Sebastian Castellio (1515-1563) was one of the thinkers of his age who openly and vigorously 
protested against Calvin, pleading for both religious and political tolerance (Schuyt, 1997; 
Goudsblom, 2007). Castellio’s main argument was theological: “By casting judgment on the 
belief of others, don’t you take the place of God?” (as concisely summarized by Goudsblom, 
2007: 44). In his opinion persecution for heresy would only lead to uprisings and unrest. So 
Castellio’s plea for tolerance was a plea for stability and peaceful coexistence, hence a political 
argument. Throughout the eighteenth century not only the fight for freedom of religion, but 
also a secular fight for tolerance emerged, the plea for the right to fight religion altogether, yet 
in a peaceful way. The era in which claims for secular tolerance emerged - ‘radical 
enlightenment’ as it is called by Jonathan Israel (2001) - gave way to the establishment of 
liberal democracies in Europe as we know them today.  
Throughout the sixteenth century the Netherlands functioned as a refuge for enlightened 
thinkers, such as Baruch de Spinoza, who were persecuted for their religious beliefs elsewhere 
in Europe (Van der Lem, 2006). The Dutch republic in those days accepted refugees of various 
Christian denominations and Jews, the latter being quite exceptional in Europe at the time. The 
‘Concordia’ (unity) among civilians was highly esteemed, religious diversity was of secondary 
importance (Van der Lem, 2006). As long as every citizen swore allegiance to the state, it was 
permitted to establish one’s own church and live in one’s own religious community without 
interference from the state (Van der Lem, 2006). Notably, it was not agreement over religious 
matters, but the need for stability and peace between religious groups that fostered tolerance.  
The Netherlands remained known for and proud of its tolerant climate. However, as in the rest 
of Europe, the last decades an increase of intolerance for religious diversity has been reported 
(Walraven, 2010). Societal debates over tolerance as a ‘cover-up’ for mere indifference (see: 
ten Hooven, 2001) reveal that the Netherlands, like any other country, cannot escape a debate 
over the scope and limits of tolerance. Ebb and flow movements in levels of tolerance and shifts 
in the targets of intolerance, are not particularly Dutch. They can be discerned all over the 
world and sometimes seem to follow global ‘trends’, as can be seen in the way Islam became a 
contested religion in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. in 2001.  
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The term tolerance is no longer reserved for religious tolerance only. It is applied to diverging 
political orientations, ethnic and racial diversity, gender issues, and matters such as 
homosexuality, euthanasia and abortion. Common denominator remains that tolerance comes 
into play only when matters are controversial and intergroup relations conflictual. 
The paradoxical nature of tolerance – accepting the disliked  
“Tolerance is putting up with something you do not like, often in order to get along better with 
others” (Vogt, 1997: 1.).  However short and condensed this definition of tolerance may be, it 
reflects the main characteristics of tolerance that most contemporary social scientists will agree 
upon.  
First, to speak of tolerance, there must be an aspect of dislike, disagreement or disapproval. 
The term tolerance presupposes opposition or disagreement (Sullivan et al., 1982). If no such 
objection exists, we no longer speak of tolerance, but of indifference or plain sympathy (Vogt, 
1997: 2). Tolerance is only required in case of dislike, disagreement, disapproval, and thus is 
closely connected to differences between people (Vogt, 1997). Furthermore, tolerance does 
not regard just any difference, but differences people consider important (Vogt, 1997: 2): “If 
people do not believe that the difference is important, if they do not care about it, it makes 
sense to say that they are indifferent to it, but not that they tolerate it.”. This ‘conditional’ 
characteristic of tolerance is crucial to understand what tolerance exactly is.  
The ‘paradoxical’ nature of tolerance becomes clear when we approach tolerance as an 
attitude, in the social psychological meaning of the word (Sullivan et al., 1982). An attitude 
consists of cognitive beliefs about an object, affective evaluations of that object and behavioral 
orientations toward that object (Sullivan et al., 1982). In the case of tolerance these three 
elements internally contradict: one refrains from negative action (f.i discriminating, prohibiting, 
intervening) that would be in line with negative affect and cognitions towards an opposed 
person, group or idea.  
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Despite the broadly shared conception of tolerance as ‘accepting the disliked’ some scholars 
plea for ‘a warmer grade of tolerance’ (following Allport, 1954: 425) which means “a feeling of 
friendliness toward all kinds of people and, thus, not only enduring but accepting them” 
(Mummendey and Wenzel, 1999). Disputes over the right definition and measurement of 
(in)tolerance troubles the adequate interpretation of the nature, antecedents and 
consequences of (in)tolerance in empirical research (Gibson, 2006; see part II).    
 
Oberdiek (2001) formulates the philosophical and practical dilemma of  tolerance as follows: 
“Given that tolerance of absolutely everything is out of the question, how do we judge what 
deserves the protective umbrella of toleration and what does not? If knowledge is not to be 
had – at least not in enough hard cases to matter – then how and where will we draw the line 
between the tolerable and the intolerable?” (Oberdiek, 2001: 19). This is exactly the question 
philosophers have been concerned with, and social scientists alike. The fact that “Tolerance is 
not by definition good and intolerance is not by definition bad” (Verkuyten and Slooter, 2007: 
476) further complicates our understanding of tolerance. 
Political, moral and social tolerance  
Vogt (1997: 17) broadly discerns three types of tolerance. The first is political tolerance. Vogt 
(1997: 17) hereby means tolerance towards “acts in the public sphere, such as giving a speech, 
demonstrating, distributing leaflets, organizing meetings, and so on”. This type of tolerance 
concerns the support for civil liberties, typically those of disliked or unpopular groups.  Political 
tolerance has been the subject of scientific studies since the fifties of the former century (see 
Gibson, 2006; Sullivan and Transue, 1999; Sullivan et al., 1982). Vogt notes (1997: 17) that 
“political tolerance is fundamental because it is important for winning and maintaining 
tolerance of other kinds”. Vogt explains how political tolerance precedes or ‘paves the way for’ 
other types of tolerance. Although diverse political orientations were subject of the earliest 
systematic study of political tolerance (Stouffer, 1955) - political tolerance is not confined to 
diversity in political orientations. Political tolerance refers to support for civil rights across 
religious, ethnic, political, cultural and gender differences.  
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The second kind of tolerance Vogt discerns is moral tolerance. This means tolerance towards 
acts in the private sphere: “Most typically and controversially in recent decades […] sexual 
conduct, such as “living in sin”, pornography, homosexuality, and abortion.” (Vogt, 1997: 17). 
Vogt (1997) explains that what is at stake, is not the behavior per se, but the question whether 
certain practices should be subject to public or governmental control. This tension is eminent in 
contemporary public debates over euthanasia and gay rights. In the recent history of Western 
Europe a shift can be discerned with regard to homosexuality, from absolute intolerance (public 
and private prohibition) to increasing tolerance (sexual conduct is a private matter, and should 
not be publicly regulated) to full recognition of the equal rights of homosexuals to marry and 
adopt children in some countries in the last decades. 
The third kind of tolerance Vogt describes is social tolerance. Social tolerance regards 
acceptance of “ascriptive characteristics people have at birth or acquire in early socialization 
such as skin color or language” (Vogt, 1997: 17). Vogt explains it is often not the characteristics 
in itself that are disputed, but rather the behavior and acts “held to be “inappropriate” for 
people with such characteristics.”. An iconic example Vogt uses to illustrate social tolerance is 
the use of public transport and other public facilities by blacks; prohibited in South Africa until 
the end of the twentieth century; not tolerated in the U.S.A. well into the 1960’s. What is 
considered (in)tolerable varies over time and place and is subject to social, societal, and 
political transformations.  
Tolerance and prejudice  
According to Vogt (1997), the opposite of tolerance is discrimination, not prejudice. It is not the 
affect and cognitions towards a group that are intolerant, it is the behavioral component (such 
as overt discrimination) that turns a negative attitude (including prejudices and stereotypes) 
into intolerance. Prejudices are commonly seen as “preconceived, usually unfavorable, 
judgments or unfounded beliefs, often based on race/ethnicity, sexual preference, social class, 
age, gender, disability, religion” (Wikipedia, 2012), or according to Allport (1954: 6): "Thinking ill 
of others without sufficient warrant.". Robinson and colleagues (2001: 74) note: “It is notable 
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that tolerance […] does not presume acceptance of others’ opinions and practices. This 
definition of tolerance [as enduring or putting up with others] implies that one can be tolerant 
and prejudiced simultaneously. […] This possibility is rarely acknowledged in the literature, 
which tends to assume that tolerance and prejudice are mutually exclusive and/or opposites of 
each other.”. This conceptual fuzziness hinders the investigation of the relationship between 
prejudices and (in)tolerance. Does thinking ill of others inevitably lead to intolerance? Empirical 
research suggests a more complex relationship between prejudice and tolerance. Prejudice is 
found to interact with threat perceptions that in turn increase intolerance  (Van der Noll et al., 
2010). Exactly how prejudice and tolerance interrelate remains ambiguous if we rely on 
research on the subject. Prejudice may influence tolerance, but prejudice and intolerance are 
not different words for the same phenomenon. 
Tolerance in societal context 
Toleration: institutionalized tolerance 
Tolerance and intolerance are not only characteristics of social relations between citizens 
(Mummendey and Wenzel, 1999), but also characteristics of societies or regimes as a whole.  
Tolerance is associated with democracy and democratic norms such as minority rights and 
social equality (see for a discussion of tolerance according to three democratic theories Sullivan 
et al., 1982). Vogt (1997: 227-228) discerns toleration from tolerance, where tolerance 
concerns the interpersonal realm of social interactions, while by toleration he means:  
“[G]overnmental and other institutional policies and principles that limit discrimination and ban 
some restraints on individual’s liberties. Toleration, then, involves legal and institutional 
prohibitions of discrimination, whether that be done by broad constitutional principles limiting 
government action […] or by more narrowly gauged legislation […]. Toleration also has an 
intellectual component; it not only involves laws and organizations, but also societal and 
governmental principles of justice and fairness.”.  
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With toleration Vogt thus refers to what Mutz (2001) calls the democratic ‘rules of the game’. 
Toleration in societies remains “a matter of degree, a continuum, rather than an absolute 
measure” (Vogt, 1997). Vogt discerns six societal conditions that foster toleration: social 
diversity; a market economy; democratic political institutions; epistemological uncertainty; the 
predominance of rational calculation over tradition; and a critical mass of knowledge 
occupations (Vogt, 1990, in: Vogt, 1997: 227-235). Vogt (1997: 252) argues that “[these societal 
conditions] make toleration more likely, they do not trigger it.”. A relation between toleration 
as a societal characteristic and tolerance in the social domain is often assumed (Sullivan and 
Transue, 1999), but empirical evidence is ambiguous. The first large-scale investigation of levels 
of tolerance among U.S.-citizens by Stouffer in the fifties (Stouffer, 1955) led to the finding that 
a majority of citizens did not support equal rights for all political groups, while the U.S.A. was 
considered to be an established democracy. However, in an international comparative study 
political tolerance was found to be “greater in stable democracies that have endured over time 
- the longer, the better” (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 243). Van der Noll (2010: 192) 
demonstrates “that countries have a large influence on whether someone supports the ban on 
headscarves, indicating that contextual differences matter”. Vogt (1997: 39) refers to the work 
of Amartya Sen (1995) and Partha Dasgupta (1993, 1995) to argue that democracy, open 
government and civil liberties are inversely proportional to a variety of social problems in poor 
countries, and concludes that “Democracy, rights, liberties and tolerance are good for societies 
as a whole and for the people in them, including poor people and those subject to 
discrimination.”. 
Tolerance vs rights 
Vogt (1997: 12) quotes Berlin (1969) to exemplify the distinction between rights and tolerance:  
“Toleration is a matter of freedom from; rights are usually instances of positive liberty, of 
freedom to.”. Rights and tolerance are not the same. Vogt (1997: 12-13) outlines three shifts 
from tolerance to rights. The first distinction lies in a change in emphasis from permitting to 
protecting certain freedoms. It is the difference between shutting one’s eye to something that 
is not allowed or considered socially undesirable (such as the ‘don’t tell, don’t ask’-policy 
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towards homosexuality in the American army, a policy established by Bill Clinton in the 
nineties), to a legal and protected status (a position homosexuals gained in the US-army not 
until 2010, under president Obama’s presidency). The second change Vogt discerns, concerns a 
shift in the burden of proof. When the burden of proof shifts from those arguing for tolerance 
to those arguing for repression, this signals a de-emphasis on toleration and a shift towards 
rights. Toleratees need to plea for acceptance, and can be denied tolerance by more powerful 
others, while rights are non-negotiable. The third aspect of the shift from toleration to rights is 
governmental self-restraint in the exercise of repressive power. Thus, a democratic government 
should be reluctant to overrule minority rights. Vogt (1997: 13) notes that “in a dozen or so 
nations (Britain, Canada, France, Holland, and the United States, among others) by the 20th 
century the weights have shifted from the mere tolerance side of the balance to the full rights 
side”.  
Power dimensions underlying tolerance  
Obviously, tolerance can only be tolerance, if the tolerator has the power to intervene. Only if 
there is an option not to tolerate, we can speak of tolerance. When a person feels intimidated 
or has no power to interfere, it is improper to speak of tolerance. Self-restraint or the decision 
‘not to indulge’ is essential to tolerance (Goudsblom, 2007). The ‘toleratee’ or object of 
tolerance has less of a choice than the one tolerating. This implies a power relationship 
between the subject and the object of tolerance (Goudsblom, 2007).  
Tolerance and intolerance characterize the nature of the relationship between (groups of) 
people (Mummendey and Wenzel, 1999). Tolerance as well as intolerance reflect social 
inequality between groups. Social psychological analyses of intergroup relations (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) suggest that relationships between groups in society 
always incorporate a power imbalance. Which groups tolerate and which groups are tolerated, 
can be seen as a ‘social representation’ of societal status (Hagendoorn, 1995). Awareness of 
this power dimension underlying (in)tolerance is crucial to understand changes in tolerance 
levels as well as shifts in the objects of (in)tolerance. These shifts are also notable in research 
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on intolerance. For instance, in the 20th century research on prejudice, discrimination and 
intolerance was typically about racial discrimination. With the turn of the century attention 
shifted towards (in)tolerance for Muslims, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York. 
Social research thus reflects societal debates over who has the power and legitimacy to tolerate 
who.  
PART II RESEARCH ON TOLERANCE: where do we stand? 
Introduction 
What is known from research on tolerance, is mainly what we know from the extensive body of 
literature on political tolerance (for reviews see Sullivan and Transue, 1999; Gibson, 2006). This 
line of research is informative, especially when it comes to comparing levels of (in)tolerance in 
a particular time and place. Furthermore, research on political tolerance has revealed – 
individual- sources of political (in)tolerance, such as threat perceptions and level of education, 
the first negatively and the second positively correlated with tolerance. Regrettably, much 
effort has been put in debates over the appropriate definition and measurement of political 
(in)tolerance, blurring our understanding of the social mechanisms leading to tolerance. Social 
psychological knowledge of intergroup relations is arguably beneficial to the study of 
(in)tolerance in a social context (Sullivan et al., 1982; Vogt, 1997; Mummendey and Wenzel, 
1999; Gibson, 2006). Intergroup conflict theories shed light on the psychological and social 
mechanisms of power- and threat-perceptions influencing tolerance. To date, unfortunately 
political tolerance studies and research on intergroup processes hardly intersect (Gibson, 2006; 
but see Verkuyten, 2007a, 2007b; Verkuyten and Slooter, 2008; Van der Noll et al, 2010; Gieling 
et al., 2011). 
Problems of defining and measuring (political) tolerance   
Political intolerance is among the most investigated phenomena in modern political science 
(Gibson, 2006). In political research what is measured usually entails support for the civil 
liberties of others; or support for the more abstract (democratic) ‘rules of the game’ that entail 
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tolerance (Mutz, 2001). The adequate measurement of tolerance however is subject of ongoing 
debate (e.g. Gibson and Bingham, 1982; Mondak & Sanders, 2003, 2005; Gibson, 1992, 2005a,  
2005b). Scholars disagree about the question of whether measuring tolerance in different ways 
has consequences for the presumed etiology of tolerance. Gibson (1992) argues this is not the 
case, at least not as far as intolerance is concerned. 
Measuring political tolerance – Stouffer vs Sullivan’s ‘least-liked’ method  
Stouffer’s 1954 survey was the first systematic large-scale study of political tolerance in the 
USA. Stouffer (1955) investigated the political opinions of American citizens. He listed several 
unpopular (mostly political left-wing) groups, and assessed the willingness to support the civil 
rights of those groups. Stouffer’s research was conducted in the days of McCarthy’s ‘Red Scare’, 
and communists and other left-wing groups were commonly disliked and widely considered to 
be an unpopular ‘out-group’ (Sullivan and Transue, 1999). Stouffer’s findings revealed that a 
majority of the Americans did not support the extension of civil rights to communists and other 
leftist groups (Stouffer, 1955). Later, Stouffer’s study was criticized for being biased, as it only 
assessed intolerance for leftist groups, and not for groups with other political affiliations 
(Sullivan and Transue, 1999). Some twenty years later Nunn replicated the study and concluded 
that American tolerance had increased (Nunn et al., 1978). Sullivan criticized these conclusions, 
arguing that tolerance had not increased, but the rejection of leftist groups had decreased, 
causing a shift in tolerance levels (Sullivan et al., 1979). As a response to Stouffer and Nunn, 
Sullivan and colleagues developed the so-called ‘least-liked’ method (Sullivan et al., 1979, 
1982). Their ‘two-step technique’ (Sullivan et al., 1982) took into account the element of 
disapproval and disagreement required to speak of tolerance. First, the negative affect towards 
several listed groups was measured, and subsequently respondents were asked to rate their 
support for civil rights of their least-liked group. This way it was made sure that every 
respondent rated the support for civil rights of a group they strongly disliked; a measurement 
technique that dovetailed better with the definition of tolerance as support for civil rights of an 
opposed group.  
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Gibson compared the two methods of measuring political tolerance – the Stouffer-like 
technique of listing several ‘unpopular’ groups and the least-liked technique developed by 
Sullivan and colleagues (Gibson, 1992). He concluded that both methods accurately measure 
intolerance and do not differ significantly in their conclusions regarding the underpinnings of 
intolerance. With both methods the determinants of intolerance remained broadly the same. 
Gibson (1992) argues that Stouffer’s method can be considered a valid way to measure 
intolerance, but it is not a good measure of tolerance. In Stouffer’s work support for the civil 
rights of a certain group may indicate sympathy towards that group, and hence it does not 
assess tolerance as in ‘putting up with something you do not like’.  
However, in measuring intolerance for only disliked groups, the least-liked method does not 
reveal intolerance for practices by groups that are not disliked. For instance, it could be that 
people do not tolerate hate speech, regardless of who’s talking. In that case it is the act that 
triggers intolerance, not the group. Other aspects that remain obscured in both Stouffer-like 
measures and the least-liked approach are trade-offs between values that shape (in)tolerance 
(Peffley et al., 2001). For instance, intolerance for a group that wants to demonstrate, could be 
based on fear for social unrest rather than an objection against freedom of speech. In general, 
questionnaire studies fall short in grasping such motivational components, that explain 
(in)tolerance for groups or acts. Value conflicts and trade-offs between values also explain 
discrepancies between the principle and the practice of tolerance.  
The discrepancy between the principle and the practice of tolerance 
Lawrence (1976: 82): “There is great inconsistency between the norms people claim they 
adhere to in principle and those they are willing to apply in specific instances, at least to 
‘controversial’ issues or groups […] the explanation for inconsistency is that citizens are 
unwilling to extend democratic rights to those they dislike or fear: tolerance is issue-related, or 
dependent on the situation in which it is to be extended.”. Lawrence was among the first to 
acknowledge this inconsistency between general and specific (abstract and applied) tolerance. 
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Although people are generally willing to support the idea of tolerance, when facing its practical 
consequences, many react intolerantly.    
Jackman (1978) assessed commitment to the norm of tolerance towards blacks among higher 
and lower educated white Americans, initially to test for the effect of educational differences 
on tolerance. A norm of tolerance regards “relatively abstract, general principles”, Jackman 
(1978: 302) notes. In her study she contrasted the general norm of tolerance with what she 
refers to as applied tolerance. General tolerance was assessed with a ‘Support for Integration 
Index’ containing statements such as: ‘[Blacks] have a right to live wherever they can afford to, 
like anybody else’. Applied tolerance was measured with a ‘Support for Government Action 
Index’ containing statements such as ‘Some people feel that if [blacks] are not getting fair 
treatment in jobs the government in Washington should see to it that they do. How do you feel, 
should the government in Washington see to it that […]?’. Jackman (1978) expected the higher 
educated to be both more tolerant on the abstract measure and to be more consistent in their 
approval of tolerant policies. Results indicated that highly educated whites were indeed more 
tolerant when it came to the abstract norm of tolerance, but did not display more applied 
tolerance than the lower educated. Both higher and lower educated ‘defected’ on the norm of 
tolerance when it came to support for racial integration policy. Jackman’s longitudinal results 
demonstrated that the higher educated did become more tolerant over time than the lower 
educated, but this was true only for abstract tolerance, not for applied tolerance. Also in more 
recent studies (such as Coenders, Lubbers en Scheepers, 2004) the discrepancy between the 
principle and the practice of tolerance is evident. Vogt (1997: 56) however, observes that “this 
kind of result is strictly speaking not an attitude-behavior contradiction’ but rather ‘a 
contradiction between general and specific attitudes” (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1977, in Vogt, 1997). 
Vogt (1997: 57) quotes Schuman and Johnson (1976: 166): “The typical associations reported 
[between attitudes and behavior] are small or moderate only in terms of expectations that they 
be very large; they are not particularly small in comparison with magnitudes reported in social 
research generally.”. Finally, some studies reveal that self-reported intolerance does not 
necessarily coincide with intolerant practices  (La Piere, 1934; Keuzenkamp, 2010, 2011). For 
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instance, in the Netherlands Keuzenkamp (2010) found that (both higher and lower educated) 
people that reject homosexuality, usually respond accepting when their own child turns out to 
be homosexual. Thus, sometimes the actual behavior is more tolerant than the abstract 
opinion. To conclude, as much as for any other attitude, we can expect discrepancies between 
(in)tolerant beliefs and (in)tolerant behavior.  The question remains, what characteristics of the 
person tolerating, the social context, the issue at hand or the judged group leads to negative 
and positive discrepancies between principle and practice?  
Dichotomous or continuous? 
If tolerance is understood as support for the civil rights of others, than tolerance should be 
unconditionally applied to all groups. This is the point made by Mondak and Sanders (2003), 
when they suggest that tolerance is dichotomous in nature: one is either tolerant (supportive of 
all civil rights for all groups), or one is intolerant. However, Gibson argues that tolerance is 
continuous in nature, not dichotomous. Gibson (2005a) claims that for any person that is 
tolerant to a number of groups on a number of civil rights, there surely is a group this person 
would not extent all civil rights to. Survey studies thus are probably not the most adequate 
mean to test for unconditional tolerance (Gibson, 2005a). Gibson (2005a: 313) furthermore 
argues that “Even if such a phenomenon of ‘‘absolute tolerance’’ exists, it is sufficiently rare 
that few practical implications are indicated for those doing empirical work on political 
tolerance and intolerance.”. 
 
Recent empirical studies indeed confirm that unconditional tolerance is rare (e.g. Verkuyten 
and Slooter, 2007, 2008; Gieling et al., 2011). As Robinson and colleagues (2001: 85) note: “It 
appears that people are selective about whom and what they will tolerate and under what 
circumstances they are prepared to be tolerant. Hence, tolerance cannot be conceptualized as 
a global structure and should be viewed as multi faceted and context sensitive”.  
The asymmetry of tolerance and intolerance  
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Gibson (2006: 29) notes: “Some important evidence suggests that tolerance and intolerance 
may have a number of different political and psychological characteristics. Though it is common 
to treat tolerance and intolerance as simply the opposite poles of a continuum, research has 
shown that these two attitudes may be constructed differently and have quite disparate 
consequences for political action.”. Gibson (2006, p 29) states that intolerance and tolerance 
differ in their ‘pliability’: “the tolerant can be more readily persuaded to abandon their 
tolerance than can the intolerant be convinced to become tolerant”. Gibson (2006: 29) notes 
that “intolerance has stronger behavioral consequences than does tolerance. That is, those who 
are intolerant, are more likely than the tolerant, to act on the basis of their attitudes.”. For 
instance, as Marcus and colleagues (1995) found, the tolerant are less willing to sign a petition 
to express their tolerant opinion than the intolerant are to express the opposite. Gibson (2006, 
p. 29) concludes: “The picture that emerges from extant research is thus, that intolerance is an 
attitude more strongly held, with fewer sources of internal discord, and with greater behavioral 
potential. In contrast, tolerance is typically only weakly embraced, is readily malleable, and 
political action is less likely to flow from tolerance. Although tolerance and intolerance must 
obviously be cut from the same attitudinal cloth, these different attributes result in 
considerably greater pernicious potential for intolerance.”.  
Determinants of tolerance and intolerance: education; democratic norms; perceived threat; 
personality factors and demographic variables 
Sullivan and Transue (1999) identify four primary predictors of tolerance in their review of 
twentieth century research – the most recent overview to date. Below, each predictor they 
identified is discussed, together with more recent evidence and contradictory findings. First, 
education plays a central -and much researched- role in the emergence of tolerance. So-called 
political elites or “the educated and the politically active” (Sullivan and Transue, 1999: 629) are 
more supportive of civil liberties and hence are generally more – political - tolerant (Nunn et al., 
1978; McClosky and Brill, 1983; McClosky and Zaller, 1984; Sullivan et al., 1993; but see 
Sinderman et al, 1996). Second, the more strongly people have internalized beliefs in the 
abstract norms of democracy the more consistent they are in their –tolerant- judgments 
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(Prothro and Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Lawrence, 1976; Sullivan et al., 1982). Moreover, 
internalized democratic norms have a ‘dampening effect’ on the negative effect of threat 
perceptions. Third, perceptions of threat are strong predictors of intolerance. The more one 
feels threatened by a group the less tolerant one responds towards this group (e.g. Sullivan et 
al., 1982). Fourth, certain personality dispositions correlate strongly with political tolerance. 
Sullivan and Transue (1999) conclude that in international comparative research the effect of 
personality characteristics remains quite stable, suggesting it is to some extent personality over 
circumstances that causes (in)tolerance. Each of these determinants will be discussed in detail 
below. Moreover, demographic variables that influence tolerance will be discussed.  
 
Education  
 
Educational level is the most consistently found predictor of tolerance (Bobo and Licari, 1989; 
Duch and Gibson, 1992; Golebiowska, 1995; Karpov 1999a, 1999b, 2002; Stouffer 1955; Nunn, 
Crockett and Williams 1978; Wilson, 1994). However, sometimes the universal effect of 
education is questioned (see Weil, 1982, in Froese et al., 2008). In the earliest studies of 
tolerance, Stouffer (1955) and Prothro and Grigg (1960) already found tolerance to be positively 
associated with education. The higher educated display more adherence to civil liberties and 
tolerance in general, and are less inclined than lower educated to defect on tolerant principles 
when applying them to a disliked group (Lawrence, 1976, but see Jackman, 1978; and 
Keuzenkamp 2010, 2011). Under what circumstances education effects hold, and how and why 
education advances tolerance have been pivotal questions of tolerance research to date. In his 
book Tolerance & Education (1997) Vogt concludes: “Education not only gives students new 
information, it can change how they think, alter their personalities, and provide them with new 
social experiences. These are sweeping claims, but they are supported by extensive research” 
(p. 246). “Education increases tolerance and reduces prejudice and stereotyping of political, 
social, and moral groups.”(Vogt, 1997, p. 102). How education advances tolerance is more of a 
question than that it does, but Vogt (1997) points to four common explanations: a) personality 
development, b) cognitive development, c) intergroup contact, and d) civic, moral, and multi-
cultural instruction (p. 103). More recently, from a sociological perspective, effects of ‘social 
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capital’ have been studied that explain tolerance (Cote & Erickson, 2009; Iglič, 2011). Social 
capital represents access to information, the provision of positive experiences with diversity 
and increased political trust, all factors that in turn promote tolerance, and go hand in hand 
with education.  
 
Internalization of democratic norms 
Democratic norms means support for general democratic principles such as minority rights, 
majority rule, equality under the law and free speech (Sullivan et al., 1982). Lawrence (1976) 
found that “large majorities of the population in fact apply their tolerant general norms 
consistently on even the hardest […] issues”(p. 93). This led Sullivan and colleagues (1982) to 
test for the relationship between general democratic norms and political tolerance for disliked 
groups, finding that indeed adherence to general democratic norms had a positive effect on 
political tolerance for specific disliked groups.  
In addition, international comparative research shows that the kind of democratic values that 
are emphasized in a country vary (Sullivan et al., 1985) and this leads to different tolerance 
judgments. For example individual freedom and minority rights are core values in U.S. 
democracy while majority rule and equality are emphasized as Israeli democratic values 
(Sullivan and Transue, 1999). The cultural meaning and importance of certain democratic norms 
leads to different tolerance judgments in different democracies (Sullivan et al., 1985). The 
political context thus influences what kind of democratic norms and values are internalized and 
given priority when tolerant norms are applied to specific issues or groups.  
Interestingly, democratic norms are modeled as an intermediate variable between education 
and political tolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982, p. 221), indicating that one of the effects of 
education is stronger adherence to democratic norms which in turn is associated with a higher 
likelihood of tolerance (Vogt, 1997, p. 127). General norms of democracy thus in part explain 
the relationship between education and tolerance.  
Threat 
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Threat has been identified as a pivotal source of intolerance. Gibson (2006): “[T]hose who feel 
threatened by their political enemies are less likely to tolerate them” (p. 24). Although threat is 
a consistent factor explaining variety in tolerance we do not know precisely where variations in 
threat perceptions come from: “few projects have been able to link threat perceptions to 
factors such as social identities (Gibson and Gouws, 2003; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 
2004), personality structures (Marcus et al., 1995; Feldman and Stenner, 1997), and 
perceptions of social stress (Gibson, 2002), but no existing research provides anything remotely 
resembling a comprehensive explanation of variation in perceived group threat” (Gibson, 2006, 
p. 24). Paradoxically, perceived group power (as an indicator of how threatening a minority 
group could really be to a majority’s way of life) seems to have no particular impact on threat 
perceptions (Marcus et al, 1995; Gibson and Gouws, 2003; in Gibson, 2006). Interaction effects 
of personality dispositions such as neuroticism and anxiety with threat perceptions are also 
reported (Marcus et al., 1995, p. 168-172). People who are more neurotic tend to feel 
threatened more easily, and respond more intolerantly towards groups they perceive as 
threatening than the less neurotic.   
 
Gibson (2006) argues that a differentiation in types of threat perceptions and threat perceived 
from different target groups should be made. More recently indeed a distinction is proposed 
between safety threat and symbolic threat. Research suggests that the impact of value conflict 
on intolerance is bigger than the influence of economic conflict between groups (Sniderman 
and Hagendoorn, 2007). In Gibson’s (2006) words: “[T]hose who see threat to their ‘way of life’ 
– not their personal safety – often tend to be the most intolerant” (p.22).  
Personality factors  
Adorno and colleagues’ (1950) classic work on the ‘Authoritarian personality’ (captured with 
the famous F-scale, that included items such as ‘Obedience and respect for authority are the 
most important virtues children should learn’) paved the way for much research on personality 
characteristics that were (and are) believed to enhance prejudice. Likewise, Allport (1954) in 
The Nature of Prejudice dedicated one chapter to “The tolerant personality” (p. 425) as 
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opposed to “The prejudiced personality” (p. 395) and, like Adorno, referred to psychodynamic 
theories to explain prejudice and intolerance, suggesting prejudice was inherent to certain 
personalities. In line with research on prejudice, political tolerance is found to correlate with 
certain personality characteristics (Stouffer, 1955; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Sullivan et al., 
1982; Gibson, 1987; Marcus et al., 1995).  
Sullivan and Transue (1999, p. 634-635) mention dogmatism, misanthropy, being in favor of 
stern child-rearing techniques, pessimism, neuroticism, extroversion, dogmatism as correlating 
positively with intolerance, whereas flexibility, self-esteem, openness to experience, and trust 
correlate positively with tolerance. Openness to experience seems to be the most powerful 
predictor of political tolerance (Marcus et al., 1995, in Sullivan and Transue, 1999, p. 634), while 
‘psychological insecurity’ (measured with Rokeach’s dogmatism scale) showed the strongest 
relationship with intolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982).  
Notably, the relationship between personality characteristics and political tolerance, seems to 
be confounded by education (Vogt, 124-128), indicating that personality ‘traits’ can be altered 
by education. Marcus and colleagues (1995) note that personality characteristics influence the 
search for valid information, also suggesting there may be interaction effects between 
education and personality that result in greater tolerance. Recently, integrative models are 
proposed, combining personality and early socialization approaches with intergroup theories to 
explain intolerance (Duckitt, 2005; Duckitt and Sibley, 2010).  
 
Demographic variables: socioeconomic status, age, regional differences, religion, and gender 
Determinants of tolerance include socioeconomic status (Filsinger 1976; Karpov 1999a, 1999b; 
Katnik 2002), age (Helwig, 1997; Karpov 1999a, 1999b; Sotelo 2000; Wilson 1994; Keuzenkamp, 
2011), and regional differences (Ellison and Musick 1993; Fletcher and Sergeyev 2002; Moore 
and Ovadia, 2006). Generally people with a higher instead of lower socio-economic status, 
older rather than adolescent people, and people living in cities rather than in rural areas are 
believed to be more tolerant. However, systematic meta- analyses are absent.  
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In the Netherlands, Van der Waal and colleagues (2010, 2011) found the ‘cultural climate’ of a 
city to be predictive of tolerance over economic threat and interethnic contact. They measured 
the ‘cultural climate’ with a ‘bohemianism-scale’ by assessing the number of artists living in a 
city plus gay activism, and found inhabitants of more ‘bohemian’ cities to be more tolerant 
towards ethnic diversity. Regional differences is often be explained by other variables.   
For instance, both religious affiliation and religiousness (church attendance) is consistently 
shown to be associated with (political) intolerance (Stouffer 1955; Filsinger 1976; Beatty and 
Walter 1984; Ellison and Musick 1993; Katnik, 2002; Froese et al., 2008; Yeşilada and Noordijk, 
2010; but see Eisenstein, 2006).  
Froese and colleagues (2008: 33): “[P]revious research has found a consistent relationship 
between political tolerance and religiosity, as measured by affiliation, attendance, belief, or 
some combination thereof.”. This effect has commonly been ascribed to ‘closed-mindedness’ of 
believers. The extent to which the bible is taken literally; conservatism or fundamentalism; as 
well as the specific image people hold of God (forgiving vs punishing) coincide with intolerant 
opinions. “If God is intolerant of certain behavior, believers should be intolerant, too” (Froese 
et al., 2008: 30).  
Women have generally proven to be more (political) intolerant than men (Nunn et al., 1978; 
Bobo and Licari, 1989; Gibson, 1992; Golebiowska, 1995, 1997; Marcus et al., 1995, in: 
Golebiowska 1999, but see Sotelo, 1999). But, as Golebiowska (1999: 43) notes: “women also 
seem to differ from men in their choice of intolerance targets”. The latter is demonstrated by 
Verkuyten and colleagues (2007a, 2007b, 2008) who found that women were less tolerant to 
(Muslim) practices that are disadvantageous to women. In similar vein, Keuzenkamp (2010) 
found men to be far more intolerant towards male gays than women. Golebiowska (1999) 
examined the sources of intolerance in women and found commitment to democratic norms, 
political expertise, threat perceptions, tolerance of general uncertainty and moral 
traditionalism to be responsible for the ‘gender gap’ in the U.S.A. Witenberg (2007) points to 
gender differences in motives to tolerate various practices; she found adolescent girls to be 
motivated primarily by a combination of justice and empathy, while boys tend to judge on the 
basis of justice and reasonability.  
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PART III FUTURE RESEARCH ON (IN)TOLERANCE  
Finding out more about the nature of tolerance and the circumstances in which it emerges  
One thing speaks clearly from almost a century of tolerance research: the need of clear-cut 
conceptualizations and operationalizations. A typology of definitions of tolerance, such as 
outlined by Robinson and colleagues (2001), could serve as a guideline to clear up conceptual 
and empirical fuzziness. In the words of Robinson and colleagues (2001: 74): “The adoption of 
one definition over another has consequences for how tolerance is operationalized and also for 
the selection of research questions.[…] Much research suffers from problems caused by the lack 
of correspondence between conceptual and operational definitions.”. Authors should be clear 
about their understanding of the terms they use, transparent in their choice of one definition 
over another, and strive for congruence between definition and measurement of tolerance, and 
be aware of the social context in which tolerance gains meaning.   
The practice of tolerance: increasing the ecological validity of tolerance research 
Scholars from a wide range of disciplines (history, political philosophy, sociology, anthropology, 
social psychology, political sciences) highlight the societal relevance of tolerance. The idea is 
widely shared that one should accept some of the very things one abhors, in order to establish 
and maintain peaceful co-existence. Tolerance has the power to overcome differences, 
prejudice and plain hostility between people. The power of tolerance is that it can be practiced 
withstanding the almost ‘automatic’ responses of interpersonal prejudice and stereotyping 
(Leyens et al., 1994). The majority of tolerance research to date, however, has investigated 
support for the principle of tolerance rather than the practice. The variation in the practice of 
tolerance has been acknowledged by many scholars, but its causes remain understudied to 
date. It is time to systematically investigate not only cognitive and affective components of 
tolerance, but above all tolerant behavior. In addition to survey studies, experimental and 
qualitative research may provide the data necessary for our understanding of the nature and 
dynamics of tolerance, and the circumstances in which it emerges.  
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Evidence from a socialization point of view (Avery, 1988; Robinson, Witenberg and Sanson, 
2001; Sears and Levy, 2003; Harell, 2008; Gimpel and Lay, 2008; Wainryb et al., 1998) suggests 
that tolerance is learned and acquired throughout (early) life. Evaluations of intervention 
programs (Stephan and Vogt, 2004) indicate that tolerance can be learned. Studying 
intervention programs aimed at the promotion of tolerance, can help us to get a grip on 
mechanisms promoting or inhibiting tolerance. 
Recent survey studies, mostly from a social psychological angle, are promising both in terms of 
ecological validity (such as the use of vignettes to measure applied tolerance) and in their 
contribution to the explanation of within-subject variety in tolerance judgments (Van der Noll 
and Dekker, 2007; Van der Noll, 2010; Van der Noll et al., 2010; Verkuyten and Slooter, 2007, 
2008; Gieling et al., 2011). Such applied research is urgently needed to fill the gaps in our 
knowledge regarding the practice of tolerance.  
Contextualizing tolerance: Multi-level phenomena affecting tolerance 
Tolerance research tends to focus on either individual or aggregate levels of (in)tolerance. 
Sources of intolerance are usually identified on the micro-level, such as personality dispositions, 
threat-perceptions, or demographic characteristics (e.g. Marcus et al., 1995; Feldman and 
Stenner, 1997; in: Sullivan and Transue, 1999). The rare international comparative research 
reveals macro-level or structural factors that impact upon tolerance (but see Sullivan et al., 
1985; Mueller, 1988; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Van der Noll, 2010). Studies that 
combine the examination of macro-, meso- and micro-level explanations for intolerance greatly 
add to our understanding of the dynamics of tolerance and intolerance formation, but are 
scarce. Some studies indicate that there are indeed complex interaction-effects between 
macro- meso- and micro-level factors influencing (in)tolerance. Jaspers (2009) found macro 
level as well as meso- and micro-level aspects explaining tolerance. With her longitudinal 
research in The Netherlands she detected factors such as increasing secularization; the 
composition of governing coalitions; immigration rates; but also (in)tolerant attitudes of 
parents and first hand experience with discrimination to impact upon individual tolerance 
(Jaspers, 2009). Jaspers’ findings suggest that there is a complex interplay between societal 
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transformations, the way politicians and institutions address and frame social problems and 
individual factors. For a more accurate understanding of how context allows for or inhibits 
tolerance, multi-level studies are essential. 
Intergroup dynamics of tolerance: bringing social psychology back in 
Differences in tolerance for in- and outgroup members imply that tolerance is an intergroup 
phenomenon, rather than an interindividual phenomenon. This has been argued (Mummendey 
and Wenzel, 1999; Sullivan et al., 1982; Vogt, 1997) and tested empirically (e.g. Verkuyten, 
2007b; Verkuyten and Slooter, 2008) time and again. People tolerate others depending on their 
own and other’s group membership. Interactions between people ‘as group members’, is the 
central theme of intergroup relations research, with Lewin, Festinger and Sherif as its ‘founding 
fathers’ in social psychology (for reviews see Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Ellemers et al., 1999). 
Strangely enough knowledge of intergroup conflict, the original driving force behind social 
psychology as a discipline, hardly informs research on tolerance (Mummendey and Wenzel, 
1999; Sullivan et al., 1982; Vogt, 1997). In Gibson’s (2006: 25) words: “those who study 
intergroup prejudice and those who work on political tolerance rarely intersect”. The relevance 
of social psychology to tolerance research is evident. Studies from a social psychological angle 
highlight social identification processes (Hornsey and Hogg, 2000; Gonzalez and Brown, 2003); 
social distance (Hraba et al., 1989; Hagendoorn & Kleinpenning, 1991); power relationships 
between groups (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) and social norms (Hogg et al., 1990; Smith and 
Postmes, 2009; 2011) as determinants of negative intergroup attitudes and behavior. These 
strands of research provide for the social and psychological dynamics so often missed in 
(political) tolerance research. A stronger multi-disciplinary approach would be advantageous to 
rather political science-oriented tolerance research. At the same time, social psychologists 
should be more aware of the conceptual differences between prejudice (extensively studied in 
social psychology) and tolerance. In much social research both terms are used as synonyms, 
rather than tested for their unique characteristics or shared psychological dynamics.  
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Annotated reading 
Kaplan BJ (2007) Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early 
Modern Europe. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press.  
Zagorin P (2003) How the Idea of Religious Toleration came to the West. NJ and London: 
Princeton University Press.  
Two accounts of the development of (religious) toleration in Early Modernity for who’s 
interested in the historical and philosophical roots of tolerance. 
 
Stephan WG, Vogt WP (eds) (2004) Education Programs for Improving Intergroup Relations: 
Theory, Research, and Practice. New York: Teachers College Press.  
Detailed descriptions as well as useful evaluations of educational interventions aimed at the 
promotion of tolerance. Informative for practitioners as well as researchers interested in - the 
promotion of- tolerance. 
 
Sullivan JL, Piereson J, Marcus GE (1982) Political Tolerance and American Democracy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
The most extensive study of American political tolerance since Stouffer (1955). Moreover, the 
book offers an insightful overview of perspectives on tolerance in democratic theory. 
 
Sullivan J L, Transue JE (1999) The Psychological Underpinnings of Democracy: A Selective 
Review of Research on Political Tolerance, Interpersonal Trust, and Social Capital. 
Annual Review of Psychology 50(1): 625-650. 
 
Gibson J (2006) Enigmas of Intolerance: Fifty Years after Stouffer's Communism, Conformity, 
and Civil Liberties. Perspectives on Politics 4(1): 21-34. 
The most complete reviews of empirical tolerance research till date.  
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Vogt WP (1997) Tolerance & Education. Learning to Live with Diversity and Difference. 
Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage.  
Not only the best documented examination of the relationship between education and 
tolerance, but also essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the complex nature 
of tolerance.   
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Résumé 
"La tolérance est une vertu défectueuse pour une société défectueuse."  Schuyt, 2001 
La tolérance implique l'acceptation des choses mêmes avec lesquelles on n'est pas d'accord, on 
désapprouve ou déteste. On peut regarder la tolérance comme 'une vertu défectueuse' 
(Schuyt, 2001), parce que ça concerne l'acceptation des différences, que nous préférons a 
battre, surmonter ou ne pas relever, entre les autres et nous-mêmes. Bien que la tolérance 
implique cette connotation négative de conditionnalité, quoi qu'il en soit imparfaite, ça apporte 
un 'recette' à faire face à les différences parfois incompatibles entre des (groupes de) 
personnes dans la société. Dans cet article un examen de la nature paradoxale de la tolérance 
(partie I), est suivi de un rapport de littérature académique et des conclusions empiriques sur la 
tolérance et ses facteurs déterminants (partie II). En conclusion, on détermine les épreuves 
futures pour la recherche de tolérance (partie III). 
Mots-clés: tolérance, intolérance, préjugé, relations intergroupes 
 
Resumen 
“La tolerancia es una virtud imperfecta para una sociedad imperfecta”. Schuyt, 2001. 
La tolerancia implica la aceptación de aquellas cosas con las cuales uno disiente, que 
desaprueba o le desagradan. La tolerancia se puede considerar como una ‘virtud imperfecta’ 
(Schuyt, 2001), porque se refiere a la aceptación de las diferencias entre los otros a los cuales 
preferiríamos atacar, ignorar o vencer y nosotros. Aunque la tolerancia lleva consigo esa 
connotación negativa de la condicionalidad, por imperfecta sea suministra una ‘receta’ para 
tratar con las diferencias a veces irreconciliables entre (grupos de) gente de una misma 
sociedad. En este artículo se realiza un estudio sobre la naturaleza paradójica de la tolerancia 
(parte I) seguido de una revisión de la literatura académica y los hallazgos empíricos sobre la 
tolerancia y sus determinantes (parte II). Para concluir, se señalan futuros retos a tener en 
cuenta en la investigación sobre la tolerancia (parte III). 
Palabras clave: tolerancia, intolerancia, prejuicio, relaciones entre grupos. 
 
